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Respondent accepts and incorporates Appellant's statements regarding
jurisdiction, nature of proceedings, statement of the case, and determinative
statutes and other ordinances, rules and constitutional provisions.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. WAS THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE AMBIGUOUS AS TO
ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO ITS ENFORCEMENT AND DID THE COURT BELOW
PROPERLY EXERCISE ITS EQUITY POWERS TO CORRECT THOSE
DEFICIENCIES?

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent wishes to clarify the facts as stated by Appellant by
quoting the transcript:
It is this Court's further observation that the
Decree of Divorce is deficient and/or ambiguous in
certain particulars requiring clarification by this
Court. In an effort to avoid or forestall what
surely will be future continuing litigation between
these parties, this Court will now clarify the
meaning of certain language in the Decree as part
of the modification process.
Certainly it is accurate, in my view to state that the
Decree, insofar as it relates to the equity in the
home is not clear. It is not, in this Court's view, in
compliance with the understanding of the parties.
It is this Court's view therefore, that the meaning
of the language contained in paragraph six of the
Decree that the Plaintiff was awarded $15,000 in
equity in the home to be paid at the earlier of the
following events: Specifically, the remarriage of
the Defendant or the selling of the home within

seven and a half years, or seven and a half years,
whichever occurs first.

It is this Court's further observation that the
Decree of Divorce is likewise deficient and/or
unclear in the circumstances regarding the payment
of the retirement benefit owing to the Defendant
from the Plaintiffs retirement. There is no
payment date set forth in the Decree. It, in this
Court's view, would not have been in the parties'
best interests to require that the Plaintiff pay to the
Defendant the retirement sums that he is obligated
to pay from his termination from his employment
as that would have had a significantly unfavorable
effect upon the value of that retirement account and
accordingly, the fact that the Plaintiff has rolled it
over for tax purposes into an IRA, in this Court's
view was entirely appropriate. (T. 67-68,
emphasis added)
On or about August 4,1988, Respondent's counsel was contacted by
counsel for Appellant for the purpose of enforcing the judgment of Judge
Frederick. (See appendix A, letter from Mr. Mohlman to Mr. Fankhauser)
Respondent did not initiate this action, but nevertheless issued the requested
deed subject to the lien mentioned in the letter, (see appendix B, quit-claim
deed as prepared by Appellant and signed by Respondent, and the specific
reference in paragraph 3 of the same to the court's order of May 23,1988)
The amount of the lien was equal to Respondent's $15,000 equity in the home
minus the offset awarded to Appellant, and totaled $6,431,000.
SUMMARY O F A R G U M E N T

Respondent argues that although the provisions regarding alimony and
child support, which were not appealed, were clearly modified as per the
Decree of Divorce, that the court below, rather than executing a modification

of the Decree instead simply clarified the meaning of certain passages of
language so that they could be executed equitably. Such clarification was
necessary because the Decree could not be executed with respect to the equity
in the home or the retirement funds without such clarification.
Respondent further argues that the provisions of Acton v. Deliran. 737
P. 2d 996 (Utah 1987) are inapplicable to the issues raised in this appeal. The
cases cited in point II of Appellant's brief involved, insofar as they concerned
the subject of divorce, the execution of an original Decree of Divorce and not
the modification of an existing decree.
Respondent argues that the issues presented in this appeal are moot, the
judgment of the court below having been voluntarily enforced by Appellant.
This appeal should therefore be dismissed for want of a justiciable issue.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE ARE AMBIGUOUS AS TO
ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO ITS ENFORCEMENT AND THE COURT BELOW
PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS EQUITY POWERS TO CORRECT THOSE
DEFICIENCIES.

The courts of the State of Utah retain an important and high degree of
latitude in the exercise of equity powers and the modification of a Decree of
Divorce. Such was clearly established in both Beckstead v. Beckstead. 663 P.
2d 47 (Utah 1983) and Mitchell v. Mitchell. 527 P. 2d 1359 (Utah 1974) The
jurisdiction of the courts in the matter of modification of decrees is
continuing, and insofar as the exercise of that jurisdiction is based upon a
material change of circumstances the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable.

In this sense, the trial court, in modifying a Decree of Divorce can in equity
exercise the same authority as it could have in the instance of the divorce
itself. (Mitchell at 1360) There is also as strong presumption of the validity
of the trial court's determination of the existence of a material and substantial
change in circumstances which authorized the modification. (Mitchell at
1360-1361)
In exercising this broad power in equity, the court can determine the
most equitable division of the property of parties to a divorce, in keeping
with an agreement forged by the parties, subject to the court's interpretation
of the language of the agreement as per the intent of the parties at the time of
the agreement. (Land v. Land. 605 P. 2d 1248 (Utah 1980) at 1250-1251)
Following the reasoning of Land, the trial court, upon a determination of the
ambiguity of a certain passage of a contractual property settlement which is
incorporated into a Decree of Divorce, can interpret that language in a
reasonable fashion so as to render it clear and unambiguous. Importantly, a
trial court is under no obligation to accept a stipulation of parties to a divorce
concerning a division of marital property, but once it does so, the court "may
modify such agreement or stipulation at the time of divorce or subsequently".
(Huckv.Huck. 734 P. 2d 417 (Utah 1986) at 419)
Having embarked upon a course of unappealed modification, and
having been moved by the parties to do so, the court below at that time
attempted to prevent future litigation by clarifying the Decree in question as
to the time and method of payment of equity in the home ($15,000) by
Appellant and the payment of equity in the form of retirement funds by
Respondent. Appellant argues that the language of the Decree with respect to
the equity interest of Respondent in the home and the time and terms of
payment thereof was clear and unambiguous. The Decree states:

6. The Defendant is awarded the parties real
property located at 356 Isgreen Circle, Tooele,
Utah, subject to Plaintiffs interest in one half of the
equity of said residence existing as of the date of the
divorce herein in the sum of $15,000.00
conditioned upon the Defendant's selling said
residence or remarrying within seven and one half
years of the date of the decree herein Said property
is located in Tooele City, Tooele County, and [the
legal description followed] (See copy of the decree
as contained in Appellant's brief at 'addendum i')
This paragraph contains a seeming contradiction. It clearly states that
Respondent was vested with, at the time of the Decree, $15,000 in equity in
their marital home. The award of the home to Appellant was made "subject
to Plaintiffs [Respondent's] interest in one half' of it. The Decree does not
set a time for payment, except that it shall be due and owing when Appellant
marries or sells the home, within 71/2 years of the date of the Decree.
Appellant argues that if she neither sells nor marries, at the end of 71/2 years,
the equity would be divested of Respondent and he would thereafter have no
interest whatsoever in the home. This is contrary to the testimony of
Respondent at the hearing for modification. Referring to the equity in the
home, Respondent was asked by counsel when he believed the equity would
become due and payable, to which he responded: "After seven and a half
years." (T. 21)
Appellant's argument that after 7 1/2 years Respondent's equity would
terminate poses, if enforced, the following problems: 1) Should Appellant
remarry, she would be penalized by having to pay off the equity due and
owing as of that event; 2) Should Appellant sell the home during the 7 1/2
year period, she would be penalized by having to pay the said equity; 3)

Should Appellant choose to neither marry nor sell the home, then Respondent
would be penalized by losing his equity in the home. All of the events
necessary to trigger the payment or non-payment of the equity were in the
exclusive control of Appellant. Appellant could, in effect choose to either
punish herself, or to punish Respondent, using the courts of this state and the
equity that supposedly vested in Respondent at the time of divorce, as the toll
of that punishment. The court below, based upon the testimony offered and
its understanding of the Decree, declined to accept Appellant's arguments,
and found instead that the language of the Decree was deficient and
ambiguous.
Hie conflicting testimony of the parties conceming the meaning of
paragraph six of the Decree, although only some evidence of an ambiguity
(see Land at 1251), provides adequate foundation for the Court's finding of
ambiguity when considered in light of the language of the Decree itself. The
court properly concluded that it needed to supply certain language in order to
make the paragraph enforceable by me parties. The court declined to add
language to the Decree that was in excess of its intent to merely clarify, and
thus declined to actually modify the Decree as such. For that reason the
additional language sought by Respondent conceming co-habitation, etc., was
not added, as it was not mentioned in the original decree. (T. 68)
The Decree likewise contained no time or terms for the payment of
Respondent's retirement benefits as per the Decree. The court below, in
offsetting the amount of retirement due and owing following Respondent's
termination at Safeway/Farmer Jack was in fact a setting of the time and
terms of payment. The court in effect said 'now is the time for paying the
retirement equity, and the method of payment will be this offset. Appellant
has, therefore received all of the equity due and owing on the retirement of

Respondent, and the fact that it was an offset against Respondent's equity in
the homerepresentsarealincrease to Appellant equal to the sum offset, in no
way is at variance with the terms of the Decree and was a proper exercise of
the equity powers of the court. Appellant seemingly wishes to add to the
hardships of lost employment and burden Respondent by forcing the payment
of theretirementbenefits in cash thereby incurring a heavy tax liability to be
paid by Respondent.
There has been no evidence that the court below abused its discretion,
which is broad pursuant to its powers of equity, or that the evidence below
did not support the court's conclusions. Absent such demonstrations, and in
accordance with the case law already cited, this appeal cannot stand and
should be dismissed.

POINT II
APPELLANT'S CHOICE TO ENFORCE THE JUDGMENT BELOW THROUGH
ACQUISITION OF A QUIT-CLAIM DEED AND LIEN, RENDERS THE ISSUES
RAISED IN ITS BRIEF MOOT.

Black's Law Dictionary defines "moot" as:
[A] case in which the matter in dispute has already
been resolved and hence, one [is] not entitled to
judicial intervention unless the issue is a recurring
one and likely to be raised again between the
parties. (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th edition, 1979
at 909)
That definition is supported by Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle.
416 U.S. 115,94 S. Ct. 1694,40 L. Ed. 2d 1. By electing to enforce the
judgment below, the issues before the court below, that is the question of the

meaning of the language in the Decree concerning equity in the home, and the
time and method of Respondent's surrenderingretirementfunds, were
decided. The issues wereresolvedby the parties following the judgment. To
hold otherwise allows Appellant to have her cake and eat it too. Appellant
can enjoy the benefits of added equity to her home, through a reduction of
Respondent's lien from $15,000 to $6,431. The financial benefits thus
realized are significant. Thereafter, should this appeal be upheld, appellant is
in an even better position, whereas if the appeal is dismissed Appellant is in
no worse position than if the judgment had never been appealed. Again,
Appellant uses the courts of this state for improper purposes, that is to
improve her position in this matter, irrespective of the outcome. Appellant
has elected to enforce the judgment, to enjoy its benefits and must now be
denied access to this Court, and its powers through appeal.
CONCLUSIONS
The court below, rather than executing a modification of the Decree,
simply clarified the meaning of certain passages of language so that they
could be executed equitably. Such clarification was necessary because the
Decree could not be enforced withrespectto the equity in the home or the
retirement funds without such clarification.
The provisions of Acton v. Deliran. 737 P. 2d 996 (Utah 1987) are
inapplicable to the issues raised in this appeal. The cases cited in point II of
Appellant's brief involved, insofar as they concerned the subject of divorce,
the execution of an original Decree of Divorce and not the modification of an
existing decree. The level of detailrequiredto set an original amount of
alimony and child support in findings of fact is much higher than that
required to establish a change of circumstances or to allow a court to exercise

it power of equity to modify or clarify a Decree of Divorce. The issues
raised by the cases Appellant cites in point II of its brief involved the appeal
of an original Decree of Divorce, not the level of detail necessary to affect a
modification of a Decree years after the fact.
The issues presented in this appeal are moot, the judgment of the court
below having been voluntarily enforced by Appellant. This appeal should
therefore be dismissed for want of a justiciable issue, and Respondent so
prays.
Respectfully submitted this

day of December, 1988.

Ephraim H. Fankhauser
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage
prepaid to Frank T. Mohlman, Mohlman & Young, 250 South Main Street,
Tooele, Utah 84074, on this

day of December, 1988.

Ephraim H. Fankhauser
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FRANK T MOHLMAN
M DON YOUNG

August 4, 1988

E.H. FANKHAUSER
660 SOUTH 200 EAST - SUITE 100
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
Re:

Whitehouse v. Whitehouse

Dear Mr. Fankhauser:
Enclosed please find a quitclaim deed which requires your client*s signature.
As you can see in the body of the deed, I reserved the lien interest in the
property to your client.
As you are probably aware, I am intending to file an appeal on the ruling of
Judge Frederick, and if we are successful on the appeal, I would expect your
client to issue a new quitclaim deed without the reservation of the lien
interest.
Please contact me if you have a different understanding about the case than I
have indicated. Please forward the deed back to me as soon as possible.
Very truly yours,

FRANK T. MOHLMAN
FTM/rw
Enclosure

LT20

APPENDIX B

QUIT-aAIM DEED
TED S. WHITEHOUSE, c/o E.H. Fankhauser, 660 South 200 East, Suite
100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, GRANTOR, hereby QUIT-CLAIMS to KATHLEEN S.
WHITEHOUSE, 356 Isgreen Circle, Tooele, Utah 84074, GRANTEE, for the sum of
TEN DOLLARS and other good and valuable consideration, all of his right,
title, and interest in the following described real property in Tooele
County, State of Utah, and any buildings and appurtenances thereunto
attached:
Lot 14, Isgreen addition, Tooele City, according to the
official plat thereof, as recorded in the office of the
Tooele County Recorder, subject to easements, restrictions,
and rights-of-way appearing of record or enforceable in law
or equity.
This deed is subject to a lien in favor of Grantor in the amount of
$6,431.00 to be paid when Grantee remarries, the home is sold or seven and
one-half years from the date of the Decree of Divorce, whichever event first
occurs. (Civil N o . 83-080-Order M a y 23, 1 9 8 8 )
Witness the hands of said Grantor this /£

day of /ft/)UST%

1988.

TET5S. WHITEHOUSE
STATE OF UTAH

)

( ss
County of Tooele

)

On the /£ day of flvGu£T~% 1988, personally appeared before me
TED S. WHITEHOUSE, the signer of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged
to me that he executed the same in my presence.

L * * Jv/Xs
f/O

My

<

T-K,

*\.:

My commission expire?: '•*

\ f'ZS't/"'•':
LA! A N * Y O U N G
TOMKCYR AT U W
MOnOlTM MAIN
MYKUC I T AH MOTt

;

Tary Public
Tooele, Utah 84
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